We consider a mechanism for optimizing the value of a patent owned by an independent patent holder who is not a producer in the market. We consider two kinds of cost reducing innovations: "common innovation" and "new technology innovation" in a homogeneous good Cournot market with ex-ante asymmetric costs of production. We show that the value of the patent is maximized when the patent holder sells the patent to the efficient firm at a fixed payment who would further license the innovation to its rival. This patent sale dominates all other licensing mechanisms for both kinds of innovations.
Introduction
The literature on patent licensing has studied the optimal licensing strategy of a patent holder who could be an independent research laboratory which does not produce the good embedded with the patent (called outsider patentee) or an incumbent firm in the market (called insider patentee). The critical question is how does an independent patent holder who does not produce the good maximize the value of its patent? The literature on patent licensing is quite vast and is growing rapidly. The early literature was mainly concerned about the outsider patentee (Kamien and Tauman, 1986; Kamien et al., 1992 ; also see Kamien, 1992 for a survey). For the outsider patent holder the optimal licensing strategy is to auction a certain number of licenses in order to extract the maximum surplus from a cost reducing innovation (see Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Sen and Tauman, 2007) . In particular, Kamien and Tauman (2002) found that an industry incumbent favours licensing by means of a royalty while an outsider patentee prefers to auction off a fixed number of licenses outright.
1 Stamatopoulos and Tauman (2009) showed an interesting possibility that in an asymmetric Cournot duopoly market, the optimal licensing strategy for an outside patentee is to charge a fixed fee which is better than auction. On the other hand, Tauman and Weng (2012) considered selling of patent rights by an outside innovator, which may be a better option in some situations.
The main focus of the literature on outside patent licensing remains to be for the firms with symmetric cost of production prior to innovation in Cournot market and the amount of cost reduction is uniform across all firms if the innovation is used. 2 In this paper, we depart from this tradition and analyse the optimal licensing strategy of the outsider patentee when there are two potential licensees of the innovation, who differ in their pre-innovation costs and consider two types of innovations. In a 'common innovation' the cost of production of both firms would be 1 There exists a branch of licensing literature which focuses on a two-part tariff licensing contract in models with incomplete (asymmetric) information or uncertainty (see Gallini & Wright, 1990; Macho-Stadler et al., 1991; Bousquet et al., 1998; Poddar & Sinha, 2008 etc.) .The optimality of a two-part tariff licensing contract under complete information is analysed by Fauli-Oller & Sandonis (2002) ; Saracho (2002) ; Mukherjee (2007) and so on. In particular, Poddar and Sinha showed the optimality of two part tariff licensing contract in an asymmetric Cournot duopoly market. More interestingly, Lu and Poddar (2014) showed that a two-part tariff licensing contract is always optimal to the insider patentee in spatial models (both Hotelling and Salop) irrespective of the size of the innovation or any pre-innovation cost asymmetries. 2 Poddar and Sinha (2010) was an exception to begin with.
reduced by the same magnitude from their existing cost levels. The existing literature on licensing is entirely focused on this type of common innovation. We introduce a new dimension to this licensing literature by considering another type of innovation which we call 'new technology innovation' where the existing production technology has to be entirely replaced with the new technology.
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We consider a general mechanism for transferring the technology by an outside patent holder such as an R&D Laboratory. We consider two types of options for transferring the technology to the market competitors: patent sale and direct licensing. Under the option of patent sale the outside innovator sells the patent rights to only one firm in the market, who then becomes the new owner of the technology. Under direct licensing the outside innovator retains its patent rights and licenses the technology to the market participants directly by using the standard licensing mode of fixed fee, royalty or auction. Thus, under the option of patent sale since the outside patent holder transfers the patent right to the party who buys the patent, the new owner of the patent can then decide whether to license that patent or not to its rivals and if so, then it decides on the terms of licensing contract. However, under direct licensing the firm holding the license to use the technology cannot further license it to another party. We show that the maximum value of a patent can be realized by selling the patent right at a fixed upfront payment to one firm and then that firm further licenses the technology to its rival using the optimal licensing contract. Though the patent sale can also be performed by an auction but we will show that in an asymmetric Cournot market, auction would be inferior to the direct sale of patent right to one of the firms. 4 Interestingly, an outsider patentee would sell both kinds of cost reducing innovations at a fixed payment to the efficient firm. We also show that auction, fixed fee or royalty licensing would be inferior to the technology sale in the asymmetric Cournot market.
3 The precise definitions are made clear in the next section. 4 There is an alternative way of interpreting the problem at hand. Patent sale can also be thought of as a fixed fee exclusive licence to one of the firms with the possibility that it could further license the technology to any other party. Thus, apart from the licensing payments considered in the literature, the patentee can write a contract on whether the license holder can further license the technology to other rival in the same industry. In the existing theoretical literature, it is assumed (though implicit in most cases) that the license holder cannot license it further on its own. In case we allow for the possibility of licensing contract contingent on relicensing then that contract will also maximize the value of the patent. This requires that the outside patentee on its own does not further licenses the technology to other firms in the industry. Thus, this option may be equivalent to the patent sale in certain contexts.
Our paper is very closely related to Tauman and Weng (2012) . They also considered the selling of patent rights versus direct licensing by an outside innovator for symmetric cost firms and the buyer of the patent rights then licenses the technology to other firms in the industry. They focus on the incentive for innovation of an outside innovator and show that the innovation incentive is higher for the outside innovator when the patent right is sold than when it is licensed. Using linear demand they conclude that for large innovation patent sale strategy would be better than direct licensing for an industry with greater than four firms. On the contrary, we consider two potential licensees in an asymmetric duopoly case and show that even for smaller innovations the patent sale to one firm is better than the direct licensing. Also in our paper with asymmetric pre-innovation costs of firms, the auctioning of patent right to one firm is not the best strategy for the outside innovator.
This paper is also related to Stamatopoulos and Tauman (2009) which showed that in an asymmetric Cournot duopoly market for an outside patentee fixed fee is better than auction. In their paper the efficient firm would not use the technology but would shelve it; whereas the inefficient firm would use the technology and under certain parameter configuration it is the less efficient firm who will buy the license under fixed fee and the more efficient firm would not buy the innovation. However, in this paper we allow that cost reducing innovations are useful for both firms. We show that the option of patent sale with the possibility of further licensing helps the patent holder to extract maximum surplus as compared to any other mechanism in an asymmetric
Cournot market for common as well as new technology innovations. Most importantly, we show that the efficient firm always gets the technology while it is not the case in Stamatopoulos and Tauman (2009) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the framework of our analysis.
Section 3 analyses optimal technology transfer mechanism for a common innovation. Section 4 focuses on the new technology innovation. We conclude our paper in section 5. Some proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
5

The Framework
Consider a market with two asymmetric firms: an efficient firm and an inefficient firm, producing a homogenous good. Firms are asymmetric in terms of their pre-innovation production costs. The efficient firm has a constant marginal cost of production 1 c and the inefficient firm has a constant marginal cost 2 c where
The outsider patentee has two options: (a) sell the patent to one firm; (b) license the patent directly. In option (a) the new owner of the patent can choose whether to license it further or not.
In option (b) there is no scope for further licensing as the licensee does not own the patent right.
For the sale of technology the patent holder can either hold an auction or make a direct sale offer by asking a price. In case of auction mechanism for sale the highest bidder would receive the technology by paying its bid price (first price sealed bid auction). has to fix a minimum bid. In such a situation, the auction with minimum bid is equivalent to a fixed fee price setting by patentee and whosoever is willing would get the license by paying that fixed payment. So we will consider the non trivial version of the auction and in that case the number of license offer would be one. When the two licenses are offered by the patentee by fixing a fee, royalty or two part tariff then both firms simultaneously decide whether to accept or reject the license.
We consider the following three-stage game. In the first stage, the outside patentee decides on whether to sell the patent right of the innovation to one firm or to license the patent. In case of licensing offer the firms simultaneously decide whether to accept or not. In the second stage, if one firm buys the patent right then it decides whether to license the patent further to its rival and decides on the mode of payment. The rival firm decides whether to accept the offer or not. In case the patentee has chosen the licensing in the first stage of the game there is no scope for licensing in stage 2. Finally, in the third stage they compete in a homogenous goods market as Cournot duopolists. The fixed fee and auction payment are settled upfront whereas royalty payments are settled at the end of stage 3 after the production and sale of the outputs. Any firm would accept the technology if it is weakly better off than not accepting it.
Common Innovation
1. Patent sale of common innovation
The technology reduces the marginal cost of production by  . Given the third stage competition between the firms the efficient firm would receive the total payoff from the second stage game onwards after buying the patent at a fixed payment in the first stage
Thus the maximum willingness to pay for the patent for the efficient firm would be the above payoff minus the amount it would receive when the inefficient firm receives the patent in the first stage. Note that if inefficient firm is the buyer of the patent in the first stage of the game it would optimally license it such that the efficient firm receives what it gets without the license. Thus, the last term below defines the profit of the efficient firm when the inefficient firm has the technology and the efficient firm does not have it. Hence, the efficient firm would be willing to pay for buying the patent,
Now we turn to the subgame when the inefficient firm buys the patent in the first stage of the patent sale game. Proof: See Appendix.
Given the licensing strategy of the inefficient firm the payoff to the inefficient firm from stage 2 onwards would be dependent on the structure of the second stage licensing fee. Take the extreme case (i), when only fixed fee licensing is optimal i.e. when 
Consider the other extreme case (iii) when only royalty licensing is optimal. Under royalty contract in the second stage licensing the willingness to pay in the first stage for the inefficient firm would
Note that the maximum willingness to pay for the patent in the first stage of patent sale for the inefficient firm is given by 2 R in equations (4), (5) 
The intuition is that when there is an auction the two bidders would bid. The bidder with the higher valuation would just bid a tad above the willingness to pay of the rival as a result the payoff to the patentee is 2 R +. Under direct patent sale the outside patentee can set the highest willingness to pay as the fixed price and the efficient firm would accept this offer.
2. Patent Licensing of Common Innovation
2.1. Licensing to One Firm
When one license is offered it must be done by a fixed fee. The licensee would receive the highest payoff when it can get the full advantage of the cost reduction in the competition with its rival.
This larger payoff can be extracted by the outsider patentee with an upfront fixed payment. Any combination of fixed fee and royalty would reduce the amount of surplus subject to the participation constraint of the licensee. When only one license is offered then either both firms are willing to pay the fee but one of them gets the license or one of them agrees to pay and the other firm does not. To begin we assume that that both will be willing to pay for the license. . Here if the firm rejects the offer then it believes that the other firm will accept it. So the maximum the patent holder can charge such that both firms are willing to get the license is the lower value of the two incremental profits, which happens for the inefficient firm and is given by On the other hand, given the higher willingness to pay for the license by the efficient firm, the patentee can get a payoff by offering license to the efficient firm only. In that case, the efficient 12 firm knows that if it does not accept the licensing offer the rival would not also get it. Hence, the maximum the patentee can extract as fixed fee from the efficient firm is
However, depending on the parameter configuration one of them would be higher and thus, we can write that the patentee can get by offering only one license
It also follows that auctioning one license would lead to a situation where a firm will bid slightly higher than what the rival would like to pay when one license is offered. Hence the auction would generate weakly lower payoff than L 1 (f) given in (7).
2.2. Licensing to Two Firms
We now consider the other option of offering two licenses directly to two firms at a uniform two part tariff ( , ). Note that only fixed fee or only royalty are the two polar cases of this general uniform two part tariff. (ii) When   6 11 13 2 6 11 13 
Lemma 4. In case of licensing of common innovation to two firms the outside patentee would offer (i) When
1 2 1 2       c
Proof: See Appendix 13
Since our purpose is to find the optimal value of a patent we are not comparing the payoffs of the outside patentee for one or two licenses to establish the optimal licensing contract in order to avoid additional algebra. Instead we would compare them directly with the payoff from the patent sale to establish our result.
By comparing the payoffs from the patent sale and patent licensing to one or two firms the next proposition completely characterizes the optimal mechanism for maximizing the value of the patent for the outsider patentee in an asymmetric Cournot duopoly market for a common innovation. This result is very interesting as the only way to maximize the value of a patent for the outsider patentee is to sale the patent right to the efficient incumbent firm than directly licensing it to the asymmetric firms in a Cournot market. This proposition shows that the analysis of Wang and Yang (2004) by allowing auction fixed fee and royalty does not provide the best mechanism for maximizing the value of the patent for the outside patent holder.
Proposition 1. The patent sale is strictly better than patent licensing directly to the firms for common innovation in asymmetric Cournot duopoly market. The outside patentee would sell the technology to the efficient firm and then the efficient firm further licenses the technology to its inefficient rival at a royalty rate
New Technology Innovation
1. Patent sale of new technology
We proceed to find the optimal value of the patent for the outsider patentee in the same manner as we have done for the common innovation in the previous section. Recall that in case of new technology innovation the marginal cost of production c is such that
14 Now suppose the outsider patentee sells the patent either by setting a price or in auction.
In the next stage the buyer of the technology can choose to license it to its rival. The following lemma characterizes the optimal licensing strategy for the technology buyer to its rival.
Lemma 5. For a new technology innovation, after buying the technology in the first stage of the game, the technology buyer licenses the technology to its rival at a royalty equal to the amount of cost saving of its rival.
Proof: See Appendix.
First note that it is always optimal to license the new technology innovation after buying it. Interestingly, this optimality of the licensing contract is independent of the identity of firm i whether efficient or inefficient to begin with. Thus, whoever buys the new technology innovation in the first stage of the game would license the technology in the second stage by using the royalty only. The amount of royalty is equal to the amount of cost reduction of the rival. 
2. Patent Licensing of New Technology
2. 1. Licensing to One Firm
When one license is offered then it is standard that only fixed fee is charged. Suppose the fee is such that both are willing to accept the license. Then each firm knows that if it does not accept the licensing contract the technology would go to the other firm. Thus, the efficient firm is willing to accept the license provided that the fee is not more than 
On the other hand, if the offer of one license at a fee is such that it is acceptable to one firm only then the patentee offers the license to the inefficient firm only at a fixed fee which is given by
It is also clear that if one license is offered under auction then the maximum the outside patentee will get is the minimum payoff in (10) plus a small amount close to zero. However, the payoffs from patent sale would dominate each of the payoffs given in (10). Hence, the payoff under auction will also be dominated by the payoff from patent sale to the efficient firm (see the proof of proposition 2 in Appendix).
2. 2. Licensing to Two Firms
We consider the general licensing scheme involving a uniform two part tariff as a combination of a fixed fee and a royalty ) , ( r f to both firms. We impose the natural restrictions that 0  f and 1   r . The following lemma characterizes the optimal licensing contract in case of two licenses.
11 In a similar situation of one license to the efficient firm would yield a payoff to the patentee 2( 1 − )(2 −2 1 +2 2 −2 ) 9 , which is less than the payoff it gets from licensing to the inefficient firm given by (11). Thus, the option of licensing whether to one or two firms directly by the outside patentee is inferior to the sale of patent right to the efficient firm who subsequently licenses to the inefficient firm and thereby the outside patentee receives T1. This result is in sharp contrast to Stamatopolous and Tauman (2009) where fixed fee though optimal for some parameter ranges in their model but the inefficient firm receives the technology by paying a higher fixed fee than the efficient rival who does not accept the technology under the fixed fee. Their result depends on the fact that the efficient firm shelves the technology in case it manages to get the technology. However, in our model the technology is useful for both firms and it is never shelved. Interestingly, the efficient firm always gets the technology, which is not the case in Stamatopoulos and Tauman (2009) . Moreover, the efficient firm further licenses the technology to the inefficient rival.
Thus, we find that in order to maximise the value of the patent the outside patentee must sell the patent to the efficient firm by charging a fixed price upfront. The efficient firm 18 subsequently licenses the innovation to its inefficient rival at a royalty fee. This is surprising as two different innovations apparently confer different cost advantages to two different firms who differ in their cost efficiencies before adopting the innovation. What is also interesting that both innovations would be sold at fixed prices but not under auction in the asymmetric duopoly case.
Thus, contrary to the symmetric duopoly case where auction turns out to be the dominant mechanism for selling the technology for an outsider patentee (Tauman and Weng (2012) ); we find that patent sale at a fixed price is the optimal strategy for the outsider patentee in an asymmetric Cournot duopoly market.
Before we conclude, let us discuss the implications of drastic innovation in the context of our paper. Note that the 'drastic' innovation entails that a firm with the drastic innovation receives the monopoly payoff in the market and the other firms receive zero profits. In case of common innovation, the optimal strategy for the outside innovator would be to transfer the drastic innovation to the efficient firm who would generate higher monopoly profit than the inefficient firm. The outside innovator can extract the entire monopoly profit either through a patent sale or by direct licensing to the efficient firm. The efficient firm would never license the drastic innovation to its rival. However, in case of new technology innovation, the drastic innovation would lead to the same amount of monopoly profit for both efficient and inefficient firms. So the outside innovator can extract the entire monopoly profit by offering the technology to one of the firms either by selling the patent or by direct licensing. The receiver of the technology would not further license the technology to its rival since the technology is drastic.
Concluding Remarks
The existing literature on patent licensing in the context of homogenous product Cournot oligopoly has mainly considered symmetric cost of production for the firms prior to innovation.
We analyse the optimal licensing strategy of an independent patent holder (outside patentee) when it faces an asymmetric Cournot duopoly market. Though the standard optimal licensing strategy always involves either auction, fixed fee or royalty licensing for the case of symmetric cost Cournot oligopoly, it is never optimal in the asymmetric Cournot duopoly case. We have considered two types of cost reducing innovation: common innovation and new technology 19 innovation. We have found that for both innovations it is optimal for the outside innovator to directly sell the patent right to the efficient firm at a fixed price who then further licenses the innovation to its less efficient rival. Thus, the paper brings into focus the significance of asymmetric pre-innovation costs in determining the optimal value of a patent in a Cournot duopoly market. The paper also demonstrates that much of the literature which differentiates between insider and outsider patentee would loose its relevance in general context where the patent sale to an insider firm is considered and after that the new patent owner can do what an insider patent holder would optimally do. Given the importance of this result it is indeed important to establish the robustness of this finding in a general Cournot oligopoly context. In view of our finding further research is needed in this area.
Once we have the above results in a Cournot duopoly case with linear demand, there are two natural questions that can be raised regarding the generalization. The first one relates to the general demand function. The main result of the paper is that the efficient firm gets the innovation under patent sale, and then licenses the technology to its rival. One would expect that this result would hold even for a class of demand functions which are close to linear in terms of curvature provided the other standard assumptions on the existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium are maintained. The force of Cournot rivalry and the advantage of receiving the technology for the efficient firm would remain even in a general demand setup.
The second question is related to more number of firms in the product market than just two considered in the paper. Though, the model is analysed in a Cournot duopoly structure but our conjecture is that the basic finding of patent sale to one firm which then licenses the technology to other rivals in the market would hold even for a general oligopoly with asymmetric costs in some cases. An important caveat is that depending on cost asymmetry between the firms, the licensing by an insider might involve only a subset of firms and other strategic motives like inducing exit for some firms would also play a role. Thus, a straightforward generalization like the symmetric cost case would not be possible.
and the option of patent sale. Recall that the two part tariff is optimal only under condition (A7). Now by comparing (A10) and (3) we find that the patent sale is strictly better than the two part tariff licensing to both firms provided that 72 ( − 2 1 + 2 ) > (2 − 13 ₂ + 11 ₁ + 6 )².
To check that the condition always holds under the parameter restrictions given by (A7),
we proceed as follows. The LHS is an increasing function and the RHS is a decreasing function of ₂. Thus the LHS attains the minimum and the RHS attains the maximum when ₂ tends to the lower limit 1 . Thus, plugging the value ₂= 1 , the condition (A11) becomes 
Now with ₂= 1 , the condition (A7) becomes 1 + 3 > > 1 − 3 . Along with Assumption 1 we have < − ₁ < 3 . Now in (A11ˊ) the rise in LHS is sharper than the rise in RHS with respect to ( − ₁), since 18 > 2( − ₁ + 3 ) for < − ₁ < 3 . Thus the LHS attains minimum at − ₁ = and still the inequality (A11ˊ) holds.
Thus, the payoffs to the outside patentee is always higher under the patent sale than the payoffs from patent licensing directly to the firms. ■ ( − 2 )( 2 − ), which is also positive. This proves that patent sale to the efficient firm is strictly better than the fixed fee licensing for < 1 < , which is greater than zero. At the lower limit of of c₂ i.e. at , which is greater than zero. Since the payoff difference is an increasing function of , the payoff difference is always positive. Note that when x goes to the upper limit at
, the value of 2 must be . Then the payoff difference becomes 3( − ) 2 . Thus, for all possible parameter constellations admissible in the given context we have that T1 is strictly better than 2 ( , ).
Hence, the Proposition 2 is proved. ■
